Can it be gamed?

Claim benefit that never happened — the NBR equivalent of invoicing for work you didn't do.

Faking the physical world. Rewards are computed from results, so the attacker must manufacture evidence of outcomes — and people willing to swear they benefited from outcomes that don't exist.

A recorded result needs confirmations from the people who benefited and the people who co-produced it, with independent third-party verifiers and watchdog reports locked into the same ledger. No confirmations, no reward. Big rewards need big, many-witness results.

Small claims with few witnesses are easier to fake than large ones — petty fraud is possible. But the reward scales with the result, so faking small yields small.

Recruit fake "beneficiaries" who confirm your fake results — defeat Vector 1's witnesses by owning them.

Every member stays loyal forever, for a payoff they can't even be paid in — NBR is non-transferable, so the ringleader cannot cut anyone in. Recruiting means asking people to lie for nothing.

Defection pays better than loyalty. Reporting the ring is itself a net-beneficial act that earns the reporter NBR — every conspirator is a walking payout waiting to happen, and only the first to report collects it.

Tight-knit groups (families, close friends) could sustain small rings on trust alone. Again the scale ceiling bites: rings big enough to matter are big enough to leak.

A loophole profiteer bribes a citizen-jury member — with gifts, since NBR can't change hands — to keep a profitable loophole open.

Finding a juror (selection is random, by device — membership isn't advertised), then swaying the outcome through them.

Juries are large; one member can't carry a verdict, so one bribe buys nothing. The bribe itself is a recorded property transfer to a stranger — conspicuous by design. And the juror's best move is to report it: the report earns NBR, while the gift is something she could have gotten honestly anyway.

Social influence is subtler than bribery — charisma and reputation can sway open deliberation anywhere humans deliberate. Wide participation dilutes it; nothing eliminates it.

Regulatory capture, Copiosis edition: rig the algorithm's coefficients so your industry's harm counts less.

Moving a public number through an open, participatory process — without anyone noticing, in a system with no campaign donations, no lobbying payroll, and no revolving door to fund.

The dials are the most-watched numbers in the system, and capture runs on concentrated money — which doesn't exist here. A coefficient that quietly benefits one group is visible to every other group the moment it moves, and juries can move it back.

Majorities can set dials minorities think are wrong — that's not capture, but it is politics, and it doesn't disappear. The claim is visibility, not unanimity.

Skip the humans; compromise the code, the algorithm, or the ledger directly.

Silently altering an open-source codebase, a transparent algorithm, and a ledger whose entries interlock confirmations from beneficiaries, producers, and verifiers — with the change surviving public scrutiny indefinitely.

Transparency plus records. A hacked payout still points at a physical-world result that isn't there and witnesses who never confirmed it. Open code means anomalies are findable by anyone — and finding one is itself a rewarded act.

Real. All software has bugs, and none of this stack exists yet as production code. Openness is a strong posture, not an immunity — this is the vector where honest uncertainty is largest.

Black markets: trade off-ledger, barter favors, run a shadow economy the algorithm never sees.

A motive. With necessities unconditionally provided and luxury rewards flowing from nearly any act of service, the attacker needs something the open economy won't give them more easily.

Mostly, indifference. The project's stated position is that black markets would be allowed to exist — starved of purpose rather than policed, because there's no currency to launder and little to gain. Off-ledger activity mainly costs the participant their own reward.

Genuinely harmful trades (things society restricts for good reason) don't vanish just because incentives soften. That's a policing question every system faces; Copiosis shrinks the economic motive without claiming to end vice.